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Article 1

Death in Theological Reflection
by
Prof. Germain Grisez
The author is Flynn Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary's
College, Emmitsburg, Maryland. The following was prepared for an
assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life, held at the Vatican in
February, 1998. The entire proceedings were printed as The Dignity of
the Dying Person, which can be ordered along with two other volumes on
the internet at www.vaticanbookstore, <academy>.

Introduction: The Subject Matter and Limits of This Paper
In this paper, I shall criticize three mistaken views of death. Proponents
of euthanasia are likely to employ these views in their propaganda, and
Christians, misled by them, are likely to be impeded from safeguarding life.
These mistaken views are of concern to theology inasmuch as they claim
a basis in faith and/or seem to some Christians to pertain to faith. But I shall
show that all of these views are incompatible with truths of Catholic faith.
I shall not deal here with the implications of theological mistakes
about death for matters other than euthanasia, such as the pastoral care of the
dying and the bereaved. Nor shall I deal with all the implications of a
sound Christian conception of death - for example, the need to face up
to the prospect of death, to prepare oneself realistically, and to accept death
with confident hope when it cannot be rightly avoided or reasonably
resisted. Nor shall I take up theological arguments for euthanasia whose
unsoundness involves no mistake about death or compassion. I Though I
shall discuss the views of some theologians, I shall not make a survey of
the many theologies of death proposed by recent and contemporary
theologians. Nor shall I deal with mistakes about death that have no
theological basis - for example, the materialist view which, denying that
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human persons have souls that continue to exist after their death, rejects
the very possibility of resurrection. 2

I. Death as the Liberation of the Spiritual Person
In the Phaedo, Plato portrays Socrates preparing to die and comforting his
friend by arguing that the intellectual soul is immortal and that, at least for
a true philosopher, death permanently releases the spiritual self from its
encumbering body for a better life. The view can be reformulated, using
a dualistic concept of person that Plato lacked: human persons are nonbodily
selves that have and use bodies; death can benefit such spiritual persons by
freeing them from their bodies, when these are no longer useful.
Though this dualistic concept of the human person has influenced and
continues to influence the thinking of many Christians, it generally remains
unstated. I know of no contemporary Catholic theologian who explicitly
defends the dualistic notion that death liberates the spiritual person.
However, the underlying dualistic logic continues to influence many.3 And
Joseph Fletcher, writing as an Episcopalian moral theologian,
straightforwardly asserts dualism:
Physical nature - the body and its members, our organs and their
functions - all of these things are a part of "what is over against
us," and if we live by the rules and conditions set in physiology or
any other it we are not men, we are not thou. When we discussed
the problem of giving life to new creatures, and the authority of
natural processes as over against the human values of
responsibility and self-preservation (when nature and they are at
cross purposes), we remarked that spiritual reality and moral
integrity belong to man alone, in whatever degree we may possess
them as made imago Dei. Freedom, knowledge, choice,
responsibility - all these things of personal or moral stature are
in us, not out there. Physical nature is what is over against us, out
there. It represents the world of its. Only men and God are thou;
they only are persons.4

When discussing euthanasia, Fletcher approvingly quotes from a statement
by a group of ministers supporting its legalization: "We believe in the
sacredness of personality, but not in the worth or mere existence or 'length
of days. ' " He adds: "In the personalistic view of man and morals, asserted
throughout these pages, personality is supreme over mere life. To prolong
life uselessly, while the personal qualities of freedom, knowledge, selfpossession and control, and responsibility are sacrificed is to attack the
2
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moral status of the person. It actually denies morality in order to submit
to fatality."5
The view that death liberates the spiritual person is theologically
refuted by the refutation of the dualistic conception of the person that
underlies it. That conception is at odds with Scripture: exegetes agree
that the sacred writers of both the Old Testament and the New conceive
of the human being nondualistically, as a living whole that includes flesh,
psyche, and spirit. 6 The human person is neither the body nor the soul
taken separately, but a unity involving both. Vatican II clearly affirms:
the human person is "a unity of body and soul."7 Because of this unity, a
person's body is not like clothing that he or she possesses and wears but
could do without.
True, the image of God in human beings primarily is in their
intelligence and ability to make free choices. 8 But the human body also
shares in the dignity of that image.9 Only insofar as human persons are
bodily can they be male or female, and this differentiation contributes to
their being in God's image, as Paul VI teaches: "The duality of sexes was
willed by God so that man and woman together might be the image of God
and, like him, a source of life." lo John Paul II likewise teaches that God
creates human persons in His own image and likeness, not only insofar as
they are intelligent and free, but also insofar as they are made for
communion with one another, empowered to procreate, and given dominion
over the rest of the material world. II
In explaining the sanctity of human life, John Paul II points out an
important consequence of the person's unity:
All human life - from the moment of conception and through all
subsequent stages - is sacred, because human life is created in
the image and likeness of God. Nothing surpasses the greatness or
dignity of a human person. Human life is not just an idea or an
abstraction; human life is the concrete reality of a being that lives,
that acts, that grows and develops .. . 12

Human life is the concrete reality of human persons. For them, as for other
organisms, to be is to live, and to die is to cease to be. 13
What, then, of the soul? Definitive Church teaching makes it clear
that this spiritual element of the person survives and subsists after death,
and that it will experience heaven or hell. 14 However, the Church also
teaches definitively that until death the soul is the "form" of the living
human body. 15 In the technical sense in which form is used here, it refers
neither to a mere quality of something nor to a complete reality, but to the
intrinsic principle that makes a material thing be the kind of bodily reality it
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is . So, this Church teaching means that one's soul is not oneself, but
rather is a spiritual constituent of oneself that, until death, makes the stuff
of one's body to be a human person. 16
If human persons were spiritual beings whose death was their
liberation, the raising of the body would be no blessing; rather, it would
pointlessly and cruelly reimpose a burden. 17 But, since a human being is a
unity of body and soul, dying is the human person's loss of concrete reality
- his or her ceasing to be. That is why human salvation must involve
bodily resurrection, as St. Thomas explains: "A person naturally desires
the salvation of himself or herself; but, since the soul is part of the human
body, it is not the entire human being, and my soul is not I; so, even if the
[disembodied] soul reached salvation in another life, neither I nor any
human being would thereby do SO." 18

II. Death as a Person's Destruction from Without
and Consummation from Within
During the thirty years or so before Vatican II, several Catholic
theologians, responding to mostly similar concerns, published innovative
accounts of death. While expressly rejecting body-soul dualism and
avoiding open conflict with the Church's teaching about the substantial
unity of the bodily person, these accounts, like dualistic theories, held death
to be intrinsically necessary for human fulfillment and so, in itself, a
benefit for the human person. I do not know that any of those theologians
drew the conclusion that euthanasia can be justified for the sake of that
benefit. But they all held the benefit to pertain to death itself, rather than
to death only as a condition for entering into heavenly glory. And they
claimed that the benefit accrued in a posited life-consummating free human
act, which they referred to as the very act of death. These accounts easily
lend themselves to rationalizations of euthanasia and are likely to
confuse those working against it.
The different theologians' innovative accounts of death diverge in
some important respects. 19 But, except where noted, the differences are not
significant for the purpose of this reflection. So, I shall simply summarize
and criticize the more troublesome common features of the accounts.
All seem to be responding mainly to two challenges: first, a
philosophical challenge, arising from atheistic existentialism, to explain
how Christians can live authentically in this world despite their beliefs
about the next, which seem to trivialize the prospect of death; second, a
theological challenge to explain how death seals human destiny, so that
the blessed will be unable to sin and the damned will be unable to repent.
4
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Martin Heidegger posed the philosophical challenge. Recognizing
that death destroys the person and hoping for nothing beyond this life,
Heidegger tried to show how the prospect of death can lead a person to
be decisive and to live an authentic human life. Though products of
heredity and environment, human persons have creative intelligence and
freedom, so that they can take possession of themselves and, within
limits, decide what they will be. Even so, they tend to follow natural
inclinations or waste themselves in functional relationships and the
superficialities of daily life. Yet the prospect of death is an always - present
part of one's life, and dread of one's own prospective utter nothingness calls
one to focus on oneself in isolation from all that distracts. In definitively
ending one's life, death will realize one's most personal possibility and
totally isolate one. Thus, Heidegger thinks, honestly anticipated death
concentrates the mind, excludes distracting possibilities, and provides a
unifying principle for living a unique life. The life of someone who
accepts this principle has a definite purpose: to exercise freedom in
opting for a limited set of possibilities. Thus, authentic living toward
death frees one to live a whole or complete life in which one creatively
makes, if not the most of oneself, at least something of oneself.2°
Plainly, according to Heidegger's view, Christian hope negates the
existential value of death and facilitates evasion of the responsibility to
live authentically. The theologians who responded to this challenge
uniformly rejected Heidegger's individualistic ideal of self-fulfillment
and affirmed the truth of faith that human fulfillment is to be found only
in communion with God and others, a communion that requires genuine
mutual self-giving and other-accepting. Some of the theologians also
mention what all of them surely would affirm: that by the free and selfdetermining act of baptismal faith, the Christian, empowered by the Holy
Spirit, has died and risen with Christ - that is, has given up his or her
unauthentic self for the sake of authentic self-possession and selfrealization .21 Again, some take into account and none denies that carrying
out the baptismal undertaking requires Christians continually to die to
self by putting to death the deeds of the flesh so as to live toward death
with the hope of rising with Christ to everlasting life Y And all surely
would agree that, when Christians become aware of their own impending
death, they should humbly accept the inevitable as God's will and
prepare themselves to receive his judgment.
But for the theologians who proposed innovative accounts of death,
these considerations, by themselves, did not seem an adequate response
to the challenge to show that Christian faith does not trivialize death.
They felt it necessary to try to explain how the death that seemingly
happens to human beings much as it does to other organisms directly
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engages a person's freedom. So, extrapolating from the human
experience of the interplay throughout life of freedom and of necessity
- that is, of all that is beyond one's control - they posit an exercise of
freedom in the very moment of death itself, and maintain that a human
person not only suffers death but does it. 23
For these theologians, then, death is an act. Moreover, it is not
simply one act among others: "The all-important act of our earthly life is
its very last act, whereby becoming yields its place to being. It is the act
of death."24 No prior act is so truly one's own: "Death is man's first
completely personal act."25 It is not simply acquiescing in the inevitable:
"In an act of such decision it appears possible that the personal freedom
of the composite person could be engaged to an extent hitherto
unrealized."26 For the act of death fulfills the acting person precisely as
such: "This act has to be free, as its very essence shows; it is the passage
of a free being to the definitive stage which its liberty has prepared."27 In
sum, in the opinion of these theologians, Heidegger's challenge is
adequately answered by their conception of death: "As the end of man,
who is a spiritual person, it [death] is an active consummation from
within brought about by the person himself. It is a growing up, the result
of what man has made of himself during this life, the achievement of
total self-possession. It is the real self-creation, the fullness of his freely
exercised personal reality."28
For Heidegger, however, the prospect of death puts human freedom
to work on the realization of this-worldly possibilities, while for the
theologians who regard death as consummation from within, the act's
object is the person's eternal destiny: either fulfillment in heavenly
communion or isolation in defiant autonomy. Either option, they
suggest, somehow resolves the tensions among all the tentative,
particular choices an individual has made during his or her life, gathers
them up, and definitively completes them. 29 Thus, they hold, the blessed
cannot sin because their free act of death completely determines them
to heavenly communion, and the damned cannot repent because their
free act of death completely determines them to defiant autonomy. In this
way, these theologians think, their theory responds also to the theological
challenge to explain how death seals human destiny.
This conception of death as a consummating option is theologically
unsound for at least two reasons. 3D
First, it is a matter of faith that humankind's first parents suffered
death as a punishment for their sin, and that even their descendants who
commit no personal sin (except Jesus and Mary) inherit original sin and
face death as its punishment. 31 Now, for anything to be a punishment, it
must be repugnant to those who experience it. But nobody finds repugnant
6
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the exercise of his or her own freedom. Therefore, death cannot be a
consummating exercise of freedom.
The theologians who claim that death is such an exercise respond
by distinguishing between death as destruction from without and death as
consummation from within, and by saying that sinless humankind would
have engaged in the latter without undergoing the former: ''This end of man
in Paradise, a death without dying, would have been a pure, apparent and
active consummation of the whole man by an inward movement, free of
death in the proper sense, that is, without suffering any violent dissolution of
his actual bodily constitution through a power from without."32
But this answer raises further questions. If active consummation
would have occurred in Paradise without death in the proper sense, why
should the comparable act of fallen humans be regarded as the act of
death rather than simply as an act occasioned and conditioned by death?
Again, why call an act that is free of death in the proper sense an act of
"death," and why say that people in Paradise would have "died without
dying"? If not simply nonsense, such talk is misleading. Plainly, it serves
only one purpose: unless the consummating exercise of freedom would
somehow have been death for sinless humans, it cannot be the act of
death for us. Thus, the theologians who posited a consummating act of
freedom would have stated their position more simply and clearly had
they said, not that it is "the act of death," but that it is an act which, for
fallen humankind, is occasioned and conditioned by death. 33
At least some of those theologians would answer that in fallen
humans the consummating exercise of freedom is an act of death because
by it the person as a whole relinquishes life, so that the body's activity
ceases and the soul's activity disengages itself.34 But that answer would
not help, for, even if the dying person freely gives up the ghost or that
person's soul freely lets go of his or her body, that act of death cannot be
identified with the posited consummating option. For that hypothesized
option has a different object: fulfillment in heavenly communion or
isolation in defiant autonomy.
At least one of these theologians would answer that the final option
precisely is to make or to refuse an ultimate act of self-surrender, to resign
oneself with faith to destruction or to resist the ultimate self-emptying of
death. 35 Initially, this might seem cogent: it makes the consummating
option bear directly on death. But what sense does it really make to speak
of self-surrender in the moment of death? With one's last breath, one can
commend one's soul to God, resigning oneself to a foreseen but not yet
present inevitability - "Father, into your hands I commend my spirit" (Lk
23.46) - or one can refuse to do so. But when one is actually overtaken by
death, one has no time left for acting. The time for self-surrender is past.
February, 2002
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The second reason for the theological unsoundness of the conception
of death as a consummating final option is, ironically, the very theological
challenge to which these theologians were attempting to respond,
namely, that people who die in God's love can never lose it, and people
who die in mortal sin can never repent. 36 This truth pertains to Catholic
faith. 37 Therefore, it is theologically untenable to hold that anybody can
make a final option for or against God after death.
Recognizing this problem, a proponent of the theory of final option
can say that it "occurs neither before nor after death, but in death" and that to
hold that the fmal option takes place after death would "be contrary to the
Church's teaching on the unalterability of the state a man reaches through
his death."38 Thus, some proponents insist that the option pertains to the
whole person, somehow including the body,39 and some that it occurs in
the very moment of death, which, they argue, is not yet after death.40
But all of them, when focusing on the uniqueness of the final
option by contrast with all the acts that precede it, refer to the one making
the option. In doing so, they inadvertently reveal what sort of acting
subject is required to make a final option. "Freedom was indispensable
for the acts of earthly life, because they exercised some definite
influence; surely freedom is indispensable for the act which definitely
settles everything. The personal self was whole and free when it was
confined to the body and shared in its servitudes; it must be so all the
more at the moment of liberation."41 "In disengaging itself from the body,
the soul freely assumes a consistent attitude to the world of values that
was not realizable to this extent before. It wills as spirit what is forced
upon it as body - its own temporary separation from the body."42 "If at
the moment of separation, of death, the soul is active, its activity is of the
same nature as that of the separate intelligences."43 "In death the
individual existence takes its place on the confines of all being, suddenly
awake, in full knowledge and liberty. The hidden dynamism of existence
by which a man has lived until then - through without his ever having
been able to exploit it in its fullest measure - is now brought to
completion, freely and consciously."44
The subject of the hypothesized final option must be the personal
self no longer confined to the body, the soul willing as spirit, the soul
acting as the angels act, the individual existence no longer located in the
physical universe. But during the time of an acting person's life, it is not
the soul that deliberates, freely chooses, and acts. Rather, it is the bodily
person, alive by his or her informing soul, who acts by exercising not
only spiritual capacities of intelligence and freedom but capacities of
imagination, feeling, and so on - capacities that involve bodily organs.
So, the subject making the supposed final option cannot be the acting
8
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person, the bodily person informed by his or her soul. Rather, the subject
of such a consummatory act could only be a soul no longer informing a
bodily person.
A soul no longer informing a bodily person is the surviving
spiritual element of a person who has died. So, even though these
theologians speak of the body's involvement and of a final option at the
very moment of death, it is clear from their references to the one making
the option that it could only be made after death. But an after-death
option that could change one's eternal destiny is theologically untenable.
And positing a final option that could not affect one's eternal destiny
would be theologically pointless. For such an option could not save
anyone overtaken by death in un-repented mortal sin, and that possibility
was what made the idea of a final option intriguing. So, the conception of
death as a consummating final option is theologically unsound, being
either untenable or pointless.
What, then, of the challenges to which the innovative theologies of
death attempted to respond: the philosophical challenge to show how
Christians can live authentically and take death seriously, and the
theological challenge to explain how death seals human destiny? The
latter challenge was poignantly articulated by one of the innovative
theologians. He considered the theory of final option the only alternative
to "the puerile concept of final perseverance which seems to regard God
as engaged in a whimsical game, calling one to eternity from a sort of
ambush so that if one happens to be in the state of grace at the moment,
so much the better for him, if not, so much the worse."45
Clearly, the challenges were formidable for theologians imbued
with a legalism that regarded this life as nothing but a probationary
period and regarded moral norms as arbitrary divine commands
constituting a kind of test, with heaven the reward for obedience and with
hell the punishment for disobedience. So, a sound response must begin
by recalling that God, who does nothing arbitrarily, acts always
according to his wise and loving plan, and that moral norms articulate
necessary conditions for human persons' cooperation in carrying out that
plan. In God's all-embracing, providential plan, each person has a role to
play: a life of good deeds prepared for him or her to walk in, a personal
vocation. 46 If a person not only responds to the splendid truth about
human good embodied in moral norms but discerns, accepts, and
faithfully fulfills his or her unique personal vocation, that person follows
the way of the Lord Jesus; contributes to God's creative, redemptive, and
sanctifying work; and day by day prepares in this world material that,
purified and perfected, will be found again in the eternal and universal
kingdom.47
.
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Such a life, of course, will not meet Heidegger's standards for
authenticity. But Catholic theologians, having recognized that
Heidegger's this-worldly ideal of human fulfillment is incompatible with
faith, should have seen the inadequacies of his standards. The lives of
eminent contemporary Catholics such as Mother Teresa and John Paul II
- not to mention the less familiar but no less noble devout lives of many
Christians through two millennia - have hardly been frittered away in
pursuing distractions and evading the challenges of being truly human.
Rather than creating their own plan of life, that cloud of witnesses
humbly responded to God's can and played their part in His plan.
Walking by faith, none of them could understand the full meaning of his
or her life or appreciate its full excellence without the anchor of hope
which, extending beyond the curtain into the heavenly sanctuary,48 does
indeed rob death of the existential ultimacy and majesty it has from
Heidegger's point of view. But his point of view plainly was profoundly
flawed : Heidegger opted for Nazism. 49
God does not cut off anyone's life arbitrarily. Despite any
imperfections and repented infidelities, those who are saved by grace
complete the work assigned them in God's plan and only then die: their
lives are His handiwork, and the divine artist rests only when He finishes
a master work.50 To those who are not saved, God gives sufficient grace
- everything they need - to walk in the life of good deeds He offers
them. But, despite whatever human value their lives involve, on some
occasion, perhaps many occasions, they consider doing something
gravely wrong, realize that they ought not to do it, yet freely choose to do
it; and although before death they may consider repenting, they freely
choose to put off doing so - or choose not to do so at all. So, one should
not imagine that they merely happen not to be in the state of grace when
death overtakes them. Nor is there anything whimsical in God's
treatment of them. His plan includes permitting and using their lives for
the benefit of others and the kingdom as a whole. Thus, when such
people die, they have, though unwittingly, served God's good purposes in
causing them to live and in tolerating their abuse of the capacity to make
free choices.
I do not think revelation tells us how death seals human destiny,
and I am not sure that speculation on the matter is likely to be fruitful.
But the personality development of those recognized as great saints is
suggestive. They become single-minded and single-hearted, so that
almost all their thoughts and opinions are consistent with their faith, and
almost all their choices implement their hope, which is their intention of
the kingdom as ultimate end. Their feelings and behavioral dispositions
become more and more harmonious with their minds and hearts. And so,
10
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loving with nearly their whole minds, hearts, souls, and strength, they
serve others in obedience to God's creative, redemptive, and sanctifying
plan and will. Thus, notable sanctity comes about through the integration
of virtually all the other elements of a human person's complex reality
with the gift of faith and the love of God poured forth in his or her heart. 51
The separated soul has less to integrate than a bodily person does:
feelings and behavioral dispositions no longer are in play. And, even in
this life, thoughts and intentions can be inconsistent only so long as the
inconsistency is not directly focused upon. Perhaps the separated soul is
incapable of inattention and self-deception, or perhaps it is helped to
resolve its inconsistencies, so that its spiritual life becomes fully
integrated. This would require no new choice of its own and no
extraordinary divine act. Through this process, the souls of those who die
in God's love could be purged and perfected in holiness, while other
souls were integrated around the dominant elements of the worIdviews
and intentions that replace faith and hope when people violate charity.
Given complete integration, holy souls would no longer be subject to
temptation from within,52 and those lacking charity would no longer be
able to take an interest in anything that would give them a reason to repent.
Nor need the resurrection of the body alter either group's situation.
True, resurrection will re-create bodily persons in all their human
complexity, but each person will rise in his or her very own body,
perfectly adapted to his or her unique spiritual life of God-given holiness
or self-determined depravity.

III. Death as Good in Itself If Due to an Act motivated by Charity
Out of love for His heavenly Father and for us, Jesus laid down His
life; out of love for God and neighbor, Christian martyrs have followed
Jesus in laying down their lives. Not only were Jesus and the martyrs
morally upright and holy in this, but in some real and important sense
their deaths were good: Jesus' death was salvific, and martyrs' deaths
have been the seed of faith . Plainly, too, many devout Christians have
considered their own prospective deaths a good to be hoped for: they
have prayed for death, just as for other blessings. From these facts some
will infer that death motivated by charity is not something bad but rather
something good in itself. And in some cases, they will go on to argue,
charity apparently motivates the choice to end one's own or another's
life. For example, some compassionately choose to die to spare others the
trouble and expense of caring for them, and some compassionately
choose to kill someone who has no prospect of gaining or regaining good
health and a normal life in order to spare that person (and others) the
February, 2002
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suffering involved in and consequent upon his or her miserable life.
Therefore, those proposing the argument will conclude, killing motivated
by compassion can be called euthanasia in a true sense and is justified
inasmuch as the death it brings about is good.
Though the premises leading to the final conclusion of the
preceding argument may seem true, the conclusion is decisively falsified
by the Catholic Church's moral teaching excluding euthanasia, for that
teaching surely is true and unchangeable. 53 So, the argument as a whole
must be unsound. Its unsoundness is due to several confusions and shifts
of meaning, all of which can be cleared up by careful reflection. I shall
begin with the confusions in the second half of the argument.
One of these concerns compassion. In many places in the Old
Testament, God is said to be compassionate, and His people often appeal
to His compassion. Though the words used perhaps signify feelings of
sympathy, when said of God they refer not to emotions, which cannot be
ascribed to Him, but to an aspect of divine perfection: God's mercy,
which is the form his faithful love takes in overcoming evil,54 In the New
Testament, Jesus' actions often are said to be motivated by compassion,55
and here the word plainly does refer to His human feelings. However,
Jesus always subordinated every feeling, including compassion, to His
commitment to do the Father's will. So, Jesus' compassion was
integrated with and governed by His merciful human and divine love.
Thus, compassion has two meanings. In one sense it refers to a
virtue - mercy - and in another sense to an emotion. As a virtue, mercy
is morally good and disposes one only to do what is right. As an emotion,
compassionate feeling is neither morally good nor evil in itself. It is
simply a natural response of human beings, who are not isolated from
one ,another, as individualists suppose, but are mutually interdependent
members of an extended family.
Though the natural feeling of compassion is not morally good or
evil in itself, it is morally significant in two ways. First, compassionate
feeling integrated with mercy, as it was in Jesus, shares in the virtue's
goodness, while the lack of appropriate compassionate feeling,
heartlessness, manifests moral immaturity, selfishness, or even hatred.
Second, compassionate feeling which is not integrated with mercy often
inclines people to act unreasonably - and so immorally, even if
blamelessly due to lack of sufficient reflection. The unreasonable
response can be of different sorts. Very often, people moved by
compassion omit fulfilling responsibilities so as to avoid inflicting pain
or hardship. Sometimes, though lacking adequate skill or resources,
people compassionately try to help others and the well-meaning effort
only makes matters worse. Again, and even more seriously, those driven
12
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by feelings of compassion for people who are obviously suffering
sometimes condone or take part in serious injustices. 56
Thus, unless integrated with the virtue of mercy, compassionate
feelings may fail to bring practical wisdom into play and all too often
lead to the folly of trying to achieve good by doing evil. That is precisely
what happens when compassion moves people to commit suicide in order
to spare others or to kill others, at their request or not, in order to end
their suffering.
The moral ambiguity of compassionate feelings often is overlooked
today. Contemporary culture has been influenced by secularism, which
usually regards altruistic sentiments as a sound guide to right or wrong.
Pain and suffering are widely regarded not only as intrinsically evil but
as the worst evils, while pleasure and enjoyment are regarded as
intrinsically good and even as the highest goods. Morality often is
reduced to doing what one can to minimize pain and suffering and to
maximize pleasure and enjoyment. Many people who do not believe
in God find this view congenial because it locates the ultimate
principles of morality in human experience rather than beyond it.
Many also like the way it displaces traditional morality 'S focus on
intelligible, fundamental goods - fidelity, marriage itself, human life
- and makes way for a permissive new morality regarding sex,
marriage, and killing. Even some believers now fail to distinguish the
feeling of compassion from the virtue of mercy and uncritically accept
secularist ideas. 57
Keeping this distinction in mind, however, one can easily see that,
even if motivated by feelings of compassion, a choice to kill oneself or
another is no exercise of charity but rather is gravely contrary to it. As was
explained in Section I above, life is a person's concrete reality and death is
his or her ceasing to be; a choice to kill a person is therefore a choice to
destroy him or her. But charity creates, sustains, nurtures, and cherishes; it
never destroys. Therefore, loving self and neighbor with charity and acting
with authentic mercy, one never will choose to kill oneself or anyone else.
Does it follow that one always must do everything possible to
sustain life and may never do anything that will bring about anyone's
death? Not at all. To see why, one must understand the structure or
morally significant human actions, which carry out free choices.
In making a choice, one generally chooses to do something. (If one
can and should do something but chooses not to do it, the adoption of that
proposal also is a human action - an act of omission - but for
simplicity 's sake I shall not repeatedly mention omissions here.) Before
choosing, individuals deliberate about options they consider possible and
interesting - I could do this or that - much as a deliberative body
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debates options proposed in members' motions. A choice to do something
adopts a proposal just as a group's vote does, and in both cases the action
is completed by carrying out what is decided. One's specifically human
action is the unified whole: the choice by which one adopts a proposal
together with (and shaping) the behavior by which one carries it out.
Since the carrying out of the choice is what is proposed by the
acting person, carrying it out is the immediate goal of his or her choosing
(the acting person's "proximate end"). The acting person's purpose in
adopting the proposal also is an end - the real or apparent good hoped
for in making the choice (the "end in view"). (In many cases, a person
has more than one end in view. Here and in what follows, end refers to
those cases as well.) Thus, in choosing to do an action, a person can be
said to intend both the choice's execution and the end in view. Rut intend
also can be contrasted with choose and used to refer exclusively to the
willing of ends in view, whether intermediate or ultimate. And the
execution of the choice can be thought of, not as the proximate end of
choosing, but only as a means of pursuing the end in view.
In any case, acting persons do not do everything that results from
their actions. Whenever carrying out a choice involves outward behavior,
that behavior has effects neither included in the acting person's proposal
nor in his or her end in view. For example, taking medication for an
allergy may cause drowsiness. Sometimes, such effects are not foreseen,
but even if they are, they are not part of the person's action. Rather, they
are side effects of it. Still, since an action's foreseen side effects could be
avoided by not choosing to do the action, a person who makes a choice
while foreseeing that carrying it out will have side effects freely accepts
those side effects and, in doing the action, knowingly brings them about.
So, people bear some responsibility for their actions' side effects, and
that responsibility is easily confused with their responsibility for choices
they reluctantly make. 58
With this explanation in mind, one can see that a person can bring
about someone's death without choosing to kill or intending death as an
end in view, but only accepting death as a side effect. Doing that can be
wrong. For example, without intending to kill, one might wrongly bring
about one's own death by abusing drugs, or another's death by stealing
something that person needs for survival.
But one also might rightly bring about one's own or another's death
as a side effect of an upright choice. For example, if no better means of
easing the suffering of a dying patient is available and sedation will not
prevent him or her from fulfilling exigent responsibilities, the narcotics
necessary to suppress the patient's pain may be administered so as to
suppress it, even if it is foreseen that doing so will have the side effect of
14
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shortening life. 59 Contrast that action with a homicidal choice in an
empirically similar situation: desiring to shorten life so as to eliminate
pain (and perhaps other burdens) but wishing to leave no evidence of
suicide or homicide, someone might choose to use the same analgesics
- perhaps, but not necessarily, in a larger dose. 60
Similarly, a choice not to do everything possible to keep someone
alive can be homicidal, but also can be morally acceptable and even
obligatory. Suppose, for example, a baby is born with severe abnormalities
including a life-threatening heart defect, for which the attending pediatrician
recommends surgery. If the parents, wanting only normal children,
decide to refuse the surgery so that this baby will die, their choice is
homicidal. But the parents of a similar baby might well be justified in
accepting the child's death as a side effect of caring for him or her as best
they can while forgoing the surgery so as to avoid the burdens that they
need not, and perhaps ought not, accept. (Available health care personnel
and facilities may be deficient, so that the prospect of the surgery's
success might be low; the parents may be poor, so that paying for the
surgery would deprive their other children of necessities .) Not obtaining
the surgery in such cases would not carry out a homicidal choice. The
child's death due to the unrepaired heart defect would be the side effect
of a choice - probably morally good and perhaps even obligatory - to use
available resources in other ways of caring for that child and the others.
It is worth noticing that in some cases people using ordinary
language or legal terminology speak of a death that was not intended, in
the ethical sense I have just explained, as "intentional", meaning foreseen
and voluntarily brought about. For example, if the owner of a failing
business set fire to his shop in order to collect the insurance, not
expecting the night watchman to escape the flames, many people who
learned of the crime and some courts would say that the watchman's
death was intentionally brought about by the arsonist, even though the
death was neither anything he chose nor any purpose he had in view.
However, such other legitimate ways of talking about action do not
invalidate the distinction I have explained, though they do underline the
importance of bearing in mind two things : (1) that in the sense of intends
explained here, one intends only what one chooses to do or has as an
intermediate or ultimate purpose in making a choice; and (2) that people
who foresee and wrongly accept bad side effects cannot truthfully excuse
their immorality by saying that what they did was "unintentional" meaning unforeseen and/or involuntary.
Some who accept the preceding explanation nevertheless will
argue that the distinction between what one intends and what one accepts
as a side effect cannot explain how publicly authorized killing in war and
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as capital punishment, which most Christians have considered morally
acceptable, can be justified. Since the law of charity requires love even of
enemies, does not Christians ' approval of capital punishment and war
show that choosing to kill people is compatible with loving them?
It is true that most Christians, denying or ignoring the incompatibility
between choosing to kill wrongdoers or aggressors and loving them, have
supposed that under certain conditions public officials were justified in
ordering people to be killed in wars and as capital punishment. Most
Christians' reflection about the matter focused, not on the good of human
life, but on the supremacy of divine law. They thought that God's
commandment forbidding killing protected only the innocent, and that
God had directed public authorities to safeguard the common good by
intentionally killing those who wrongly threatened it. During the present
century, however, authentic theological development has made it clear
that God's negative commandments protect fundamental human goods,
and papal teaching has endorsed that development. 6 1
Accordingly, the popes increasingly focused on the limits of the
legitimate use of deadly force by public authorities. Pius XII took a
crucial step in maintaining that only defensive wars can be justified.62
Recently, the Catechism of the Catholic Church has used morally
acceptable individual self-defense, in which the death of an aggressor is
not intended but only accepted as a side effect, as the model for the
legitimate use of deadly force by public officials.63 So, the Catechism
offers only one sort of reason why public authorities might be justified in
authorizing lethal military actions and in executing criminals. In the
former case, it says: "The defense of the common good requires that an
unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm"; in the latter, it says:
"Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been
fully determined, the traditional teaching of the church does not exclude
recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively
defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.64 Thus, Catholic
teaching now indicates that even publicly authorized killing cannot
rightly carry out a choice to kill. Therefore, the teachings on killing in
war and as capital punishment no longer provide reasons for holding that
intentionally killing someone can be compatible with charity.
Having clarified the confusions in the second half of the argument
for euthanasia set out at the beginning of this section, I tum now to
confusions in the argument's first half, which led to the claim that death
motivated by charity is good in itself. That claim was based on a
particular understanding of several facts: Jesus laid down His life out of
love, and His death was salvific; Christian martyrs also have laid down
their lives and their deaths have helped spread the faith; and devout
16

Linacre Quarterly

Christians seem to consider death good inasmuch as they hope and pray
for it. These facts raise two questions. First, did Jesus and the martyrs
consider death good, and do devout Christians who pray for death
consider it good? Second, did Jesus and the martyrs intend their deaths in
laying down their lives, and do devout Christians intend their deaths in
praying for death?
As I have shown in section I, above, a person's dying is the loss of
his or her concrete reality - is his or her ceasing to be - which cannot
be good in itself. Still, one's prospective death can seem good, and
reflection on various ways in which death can come to seem good will
help answer the two questions.
Prospective death can seem good insofar as it seems to offer a
possible way of avoiding ongoing suffering. This is how nonbelievers
who choose to kill themselves or others, as euthanasia, regard death. Not
regarding life as good in itself but as a necessary condition for enjoyable
experience (and, perhaps, other goods), they consider life no longer good
when it has served its purpose. Death, likewise, seems to them neither
good nor bad in itself, but bad if it robs someone of still-useful life and
good if it ends "useless" life and suffering.
At the emotional level, there are no distinctions between means and
ends, between what it good in itself and what is good by reference to
something else. Whatever is perceived or imagined either does or does
not elicit desire and promise satisfaction, and whatever does so, seems
good. But since death itself, the person's ceasing to be, is unimaginable,
in trying to imagine their own deaths, people imagine themselves
somehow surviving, perhaps dualistically as an ethereal self flying
happily away, but probably more often as a hidden but still living person
- as in the image resentful children form of watching their own funeral
and enjoying their parents' grief. When devout Christians imagine their
own death, they picture themselves reaching heaven: perhaps being
admitted by Peter, ushered into a private audience with the Lord Jesus,
and then rejoining loved ones. Therefore, though perceptions or images
connected with death usually elicit fear or anger, one's own imagined
death can and often does seem good.
At the intellectual level, a death - that is, someone's dying, not his
or her being dead - can seem humanly good due to the human values
that lead to it and flow from it, without seeming good either as an end to
be intended or as a means to be chosen. For example, the death of a
fireman resulting from a successful attempt to rescue a four-year-old girl
from her flaming home is, in a true sense, beautiful and good. While the
fireman perhaps deliberately risked death, he did not choose to die; if he
foresaw the fire's lethal effect, he knew it would contribute nothing to the
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rescue. His death draws its goodness from his heroism and from the life
he saved. Yet these reasons for the goodness of the fireman's death also
are the reasons for wishing he had not died: his death is no benefit but a
tragedy for him and a great loss to his loved ones and the community. So,
even while contemplating this heroic death with admiration and joy,
survivors bitterly grieve over it and, perhaps, seek ways of making it
more likely that firemen doing their duty in the future will not only
succeed but survive.
When the fireman began to carry the little girl through the flames,
she no doubt found the prospect of being exposed to them both terrifying
and good. Why good? Because it was an obviously and absolutely
necessary condition for reaching safety in her parents' arms. Still, for her,
being exposed to the flames was not a means of escape: she had no
choice and did nothing to bring it about. But even if she had anticipated
the rescue and called for help, she need not have chosen to be exposed to
the flames as a means to safety, for she could have accepted that as an
inseparable part of being rescued - of being delivered from a hopeless
situation into her parents' arms.
The child's thinking in this way about going through the flames is
also the way in which devout Christians can and, I believe, often do think
of death. They do not regard death - the loss of their concrete reality as a possible means to anything. On the contrary, they realize that it is a
punishment for original sin and will remain a great evil until the end of
time: "The last enemy to be destroyed is death. " 65 So, such Christians do
not imagine that killing themselves could benefit them. But they do think
that undergoing death is an inseparable part of being saved, reaching
heaven, being raised up in etemallife.66 Thus, when they pray for death,
devout Christians really are praying for their integral salvation. They
explicitly focu s on death for the same reason that the little girl might cry
out: "Carry me through the flames! " That inseparable part of being
rescued must come first in time; being associated with safety, it arouses a
desire powerful en'ough to overcome terror.
Someone will object that the foregoing analogy is imperfect. When
we ask others to do something for us, we intend their action as an
intermediate end that will be a means to some further end in view ; and
praying for death is asking God to bring it about so as to reach heaven:
"Lord, I think I have lived long enough; please take back my life." Therefore , it seems, in praying for death devout Christians do intend that God
act to end their lives - in other words, they intend that God kill them.
Perhaps some do. If so, they confusedly intend their own death,
which objectively is wrong. Yet they are guiltless not only because they
lack sufficient reflection but because they mean to submit to God and
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Linacre Quarterly

assume that His act of killing will be good. Interestingly, though, devout
Christians praying for death seldom seem to think of themselves as asking
God to kill them. A common way of praying for death, "Please let me die,"
suggests that the anticipated death would be a side effect of God's doing
something other than killing. "Please exchange my present life for
resurrection life" perhaps best expresses the attitude of devout Christians.
In any case, though God's plan includes one's death, God neither
can nor needs to bring it about by an act of killing. He cannot kill,
because killing is destructive while His intention in acting always is
loving and creative; He need not kill because creatures never are
independently existing things confronting God but always are entirely
contingent on His mind and will. So, death comes to a human being when
God ceases to sustain his or her life, and God's not indefinitely sustaining
people's lives is a side effect of His unique act of creating, redeeming,
and sanctifying the created universe.67
The preceding clarifications are easily applied to the death of martyrs.
On the one hand, as human values lead to and flow from the heroic
fireman's dying, so important values lead to and flow from martyrs'
dying. But whereas most of the benefits of the fireman's heroism would
have been realized even had he survived, the martyrs' very dying greatly
contributes to the effectiveness of their witness. Then too, a martyr's
death is better than the death of a hero who lays down his or her life for
goods lesser than loyalty and obedience to God. For the martyr plainly
manifests not only natural virtues but the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity. All this, of course, generally is recognized by martyrs
themselves, and it provides their main reason for laying down their lives.
Moreover, confidently anticipating heavenly happiness, martyrs often
emotionally exult in their suffering and dying.
On the other hand, Christian martyrs, for the most part very clearly,
do not choose to do anything in order to get themselves killed, but only
accept death as a side effect. Many use every morally acceptable means
to avoid being killed, and accept death only when they see no alternative
except to sin. Even those who could refrain without sinning from the act
that brings about their death, generally choose to do the act for the sake
of its immediate good effect, and only accept death as an inevitable and
foreseen side effect: St. Maximilian Kolbe saved the other man by taking
his place, which involved accepting death as a bad side effect. If Kolbe
had miraculously survived several weeks longer than he did and allied
forces had liberated the camp soon enough to save him, that would not
have frustrated his intent in taking the other man 's place.68
Of course, some martyrs do appear to have intended to die. For
example, St. Ignatius of Antioch, a bishop condemned to death for his
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faith during the reign of Trajan (98-117 A.D.), sent a letter to the
Christians at Rome as he was being brought there for execution. In it he
wrote:
I am writing to all the Churches and I enjoin all, that I am dying
willingly for God's sake, if only you do not prevent it. I beg of
you, do not do me an untimely kindness. Allow me to be eaten by
the beasts, which are my way of reaching to God . I am God's
wheat, and I am to be ground by the teeth of wild beasts, so that I
may become the pure bread of ChriSt. 69

Despite appearances, St. Ignatius in writing this passage may well have
meant only to warn his fellow Christians against trying to save his life by
actions that would be either intrinsically wrong (such as lying or
compromising the Church's teaching) or gravely imprudent (such as unduly
risking their own or others' lives or provoking the public authorities to
persecute the Church more severely). If such intentions were the only ones
Ignatius had in writing, he did not intend to die but only accepted death.
Still, one might consider that interpretation implausible and hold
that, intending to die as a means of reaching God, Ignatius plainly chose
to dissuade fellow Christians from doing what they might reasonably
have done to prevent his death. According to that view, in intending that
others not act to save him, Ignatius intended his own death, though
without the accurate understanding of what he was doing that would have
made it a mortal sin of suicide rather than the act of charity it was. 70
What is true of most, if not of all, martyrs also is true of the king of
martyrs, our Lord Jesus. His very dying flowed from and led to great
goods: it was the consummate act of His divine and human redeeming
love, and it is salvific for fallen humankind. Since Jesus laid down His
life to save us, His death cannot be called "unintentional" as if it were in
no way voluntary; He clearly did foresee and freely accept His death. Yet
Jesus did not choose to do anything in order to bring about His own
death nor did He intend His death as a means to our salvation or anything
else. Rather, at an early age He committed Himself always to do nothing
but His Father's will, and He faithfully fulfilled that commitment by
carrying out the mission He was given. 7 1 Seeking to gather Israel together
as the nucleus of the new covenantal community, which is the beginning
of the everlasting kingdom of God, realizing that His effort was not
bearing fruit, and foreseeing that He would be killed, Jesus nevertheless
obediently went up to Jerusalem to inaugurate the kingdom . And at the
Last Supper, He did inaugurate it, while freely accepting as a side effect
of doing so the death He would suffer the next day.72
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This act, which includes Jesus ' laying down His life without
intending His death, accomplished humankind's reconciliation with God.
On the one had, that sacrificial act of self-giving consummated His life of
perfect human love for the Father, and the sacrifice not only would last
forever but, through the sacraments, would be available for those whq
heard and accepted the gospel to cooperate with and share in.73 On the
other hand, by His passion and death Jesus bore incontrovertible witness
to His boundless and indiscriminate human love for each and every
person on earth, and by His resurrection bore similar witness to the
Father's love for Him and for the many who would listen to Him, join
with Him, follow Him, and abide in Him - and, by doing so, enter into
Jesus' divine communion with the Father and their Holy spirit.
Admittedly, this way of understanding Jesus' death is inconsistent
with many received theological notions about its redemptive efficacy and
seems inconsistent with some New Testament texts. 74 But I believe that
this interpretation is consistent with all that the Church has firmly and
constantly taught, and recent competent exegesis supports it:
In fact, Jesus did not search out death as a means for the
salvation of human persons; he accepted death, in sorrow and in
submission, as the crowning of his life of faithfulness. Jesus was
faithful to the mi ssion received from his Father, that of
proclaiming the Good News concerning the God of compassion
and concerning love for the brethren. He maintained this stance
against enemies who wanted to silence him, by not defending
himself with violent means and by entrusting himself without
reserve to the God who is faithful ...
Jesus, therefore, did not go looking for death for its own sake,
however salutary that might be. And one can only be quite wrong
to so interpret the words he spoke concerning his desire to drink
the cup of his passion. Jesus simply wanted to be faithful to the
end. He understood himself to be within that line of prophets,
whose typical experience was one of persecution; for authentic
service to God ends up in rousing up men and women's wrath
against those who believe the gospel ...
In attentively considering the interpretations Paul gave to
Christ's death, one perceives that the sacrificial and even
redemptive understandings of this death hold up only when they
are definitively located in relation to Jesus' love and God 's love.
Put in another way, when the Son surrenders himself and when the
Father surrenders hi s Son, it is in no way for the sake of some
chastisement nor for the sake of some satisfaction; it is for his
remaining faithful to the mi ssion of love.75
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Thus, nothing requires a faithful Christian to believe either that
Jesus intended His death or that His dying's salvific benefits in any way
flowed from His death itself - that is, from His being dead from Friday
until Sunday.
Moreover, it seems to me that by meditating on the gospels as a
whole, devout Christians can find valid grounds for denying that Jesus
intended His death. For example, praying in the garden after the Last
Supper, Jesus begs the father to be spared death, if possible. Jesus already
has offered His sacrifice and, in doing so, has accepted the death He has
foreseen. But the Father can do all things. Can the Father not spare Jesus
while accepting the sacrifice, as once He spared Isaac while accepting
Abraham's sacrifice?
Yes, the father could do this. Yet He permits Jesus' betrayal,
passion, and death. Why? While divine judgments and ways are beyond
our comprehension, we can see, in the light of faith, that the Father
allowed Jesus' suffering and death at least partly because they helped to
accomplish three things: manifest the depth of the Trinity's love for us,
motivate us to respond appropriately to that love, and show us how to do
so despite the temptations of our fallen condition. 76
Jesus' very death (His being dead itself) was a pure privation with
no meaning or potential for good. But Jesus' dying - that is, His perfect
love in laying down His life - did in principle destroy death for
everyone, because that dying overcame sin, which is the source of death
and all human misery. And Jesus' resurrection somehow makes possible
and brings about the resurrection of those who die united with Him in
divine love, faithful cooperation, and eucharistic bodily intimacy.77
Dying you destroyed our death, rising you restored our life. Lord
Jesus, come in glory.
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anticipated such an opportunity for cheap and easy conversion take seriously Jesus'
warnings to prepare for death?
45. Gleason, op. cit., p. 66; cf. Rahner, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
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whole strength is to perform all outward words and deeds out of love.
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not present temptations as the (fallen) world does, and Satan no longer will be
permitted to harass God's children.
53.- See John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 64-66, AAS 87 (1995) 474-78,
L'Osservatore Romano (English), 5 April 1995, pp. xii-xiii; n. 82 refers to Vatican
Council II, Lumen Gentium, 25 (where the conditions for the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium are articulated) and the encyclical's accompanying text (at the
end of 65) states: "This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written
word of God, is transmitted by the Church's Tradition and taught by the ordinary
and universal Magisterium." That statement together with the reference to Lumen
Gentium, 25, implies that the teaching excluding euthanasia has been proposed
infallibly - see Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Commentary on the
Concluding Formula of the "Professio fidei, " II, L'Osservatore Romano (English),
15 July 1998, p. 4.
54. See Ceslas Spicq, a.p., Theological Lexicon of the New Testament, trans. and ed.
James D. Ernest (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 471-79.
55. See Mt. 9.36, 14.14,15.32,20.34; Mk 6.34,8.2; Lk 7.13.
56. Lawrence A. Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), pp. 173-82, provides a phenomenology of compassion
considered as an emotional attitude, and points out (p. 182): "Compassion can also
be misguided, grounded in superficial understanding of a situation. Compassion is
not necessarily wise or appropriate. The compassionate person may even end up
doing more harm than good." C. Daniel Batson et ai,. "Immorality from EmpathyInduced Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict," Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 68 (1995): pp. 1042 -54, report experiments showing that
people stirred to compassionate feelings manifested partiality in allocating resources
in a way they themselves admitted to be less fair and less moral than the alternative
chosen by the control group.
57. The preceding analysis of compassion draws on, but freely recasts and develops,
helpful insights of Edmund D. Pellegrino, "The Moral Status of Compassion in Bioethics: The Sacred and the Secular," Ethics and Medics, 20:9 (Sept. 1995): pp. 3-4.
58. Even God foresees and accepts evils that He does not choose: see Council of
Trent, Decretum de iustificatione (13 January 1547), canon 6, DS 1556/816; St.
Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 22 , a. 2, ad 2; q. 49, a. 2; 1-2, q. 79, aa. 2-4;
Summa contra gentiles, 1.96, 3.71. If one rejects the proposition that God foresees
and freely accepts evils without intending any evil as an end or as a chosen means,
then one must, if consistent, deny at least one of three propositions, all of which
pertain to faith: that God 's will is perfectly holy, that His providence is allembracing, and that some creatures have sinned with the result that evil is real. So,
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accepting bad side effects can be compatible with good will. But choosing what is
bad or having a bad end in view is never compatible with good will, because making
a choice is self-determining with respect to everything included in the proposal
adopted by that choice. Still, agents who wrongly accept side effects often have
chosen previously to violate the good involved or in the course of deliberation have
made a procedural choice to disregard the interests of the person or persons who will
be adversely affected, and so have determined themselves wrongly. Thus, though the
distinction between rightly accepting a bad side effect and choosing what would
bring about the same state of affairs is morally crucial, there often is little if any
moral significance to the distinction between wrongly accepting a bad side effect
and choosing what will bring about the same bad state of affairs.
59. See John Paul II, Evengelium Vitae, 65, MS 87 ( 1995) 476, L'Osservatore
Romano (Engli sh), 5 April 1995, p. xiii, reaffirming a point already clarified by Pius
XII and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
60. Though the person making that homicidal choice might claim to intend only to
eliminate pain (and perhaps other burdens), he or she also would intend to kill: the
shortening of life would be the agent's intermediate end in view, sought not for its
own sake but as a means to the ulterior, declared end .
6 I. See, e.g., John Paul n, Veritatis Splendor, 48 and 50, MS 85 ( 1993) 1171-72 and
I 173-74, L'Osservatore Romano (English), 6 October 1993, p. viii ; Evangelium
Vitae, 75-77, MS 87 (1995) 488-90, L'Osservatore Romano (English), 5 April
1995, pp. xiv-xv.
62. Pius XII, Christmas Message (24 December 1944), MS 37 ( 1945) 18, Catholic
Mind, 43 (February 1945): p. 72, teaches that there is a duty to ban "wars of
aggression as legitimate solutions of international disputes and as a means toward
realizing national aspirations"; in Christmas Message (24 December 1948), MS 41
(1949) 12-13, Catholic Mind, 47 (March 1949): p. 184, Pius XII also teaches:
"Every war of aggression against those goods which the Divine plan for peace
obliges men unconditionally to respect and guarantee, and accordingly to protect
and defend, is a sin, a crime, and an outrage against the majesty of God, the Creator
and Ordainer of the world."
63. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2263.
64. Ibid. editio typico 2265 (war) and 2267 (capital punishment), emphasis added.
65. I Cor. 15.26.
66. That plainly is the view of St. Paul - see 2 Cor 5. 1-10 - and of the funeral
liturgy's "life is changed, not ended" (The Roman Missal: The Sacramentary,
Preface of Christian Death I"). By contrast with Paul's explicit wish for resurrection
- not to be unclothed but to be fully clothed - life is changed, not ended might
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seem to express a dualistic outlook. But in context it too clearly manifests Christian
hope in bodily resurrection, which overcomes the evil of death by restoring the
bodily person to immortal life.
67. Bear in mind that God foresees and accepts evils that He does not choose: see
note 58, above. We rightly "play God" in bringing about death when we
compassionately choose not to provide extraordinary treatment to sustain life, not
when we choose out of compassionate feelings to kill.
68. Rahner, On the Theology of Death, unfortunately fails to make the necessary
distinctions and says (p. 119) that for the martyr, death "has been in itself the object
of free decision" and "death is loved for its own sake"; and concludes (p. 120): "In
Christian martyrdom, it is death itself that is the theme. Death is not something
which is merely accepted, since it has been a stubbornly pursued goal , but it is
something that is loved in itself, a sharing in our Lord's death, the blessed gate of
eternal life." Thus, Rahner, mistakenly supposing that martyrs' intentions are
defined by their emotional attitudes and by their reasons for gladly accepting death,
neglects to ask whether typical Christian martyrs choose to kill themselves or have
dying in view as an intermediate or ultimate end in choosing something else.
Moreover, with a conception of human freedom influenced by Heidegger, Rahner
thinks of the martyr's death as a sort of paradigmatic thematization of a sound
fundamental option (see pp. 89-104) and supposes that for this reason such a death
must be voluntary in the strongest possible sense: not accepted as a side effect but
wholeheartedly chosen (see pp. 104-118). Though Rahner does not say so, that
would mean that martyrdom is a type of suicide. Following logically enough from
Rahner's theory, that conclusion manifests the theory 's unsoundness.
69. St. Ignatius of Antioch , Letter to the Romans, 4, I.
70. The same must be said of the death of Razis (see 2 Mac 14.37-46). By contrast,
Eleazar's heroic death (see I Mac 6.43-46) plainly was not suicide but only a
foreseen and freely accepted side effect of effective defensive military action against
an enemy.
71. Luke 2.41-52 portrays Jesus at twelve already clear about what He was to do,
and doing it.
72. See Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, pp. 532-42, 553-55, 791-93.
73. See ibid. , pp. 732-33, and the passages referred to therein.
74. For example, the verse, "I have a baptism with which to be baptized, and what
stress I am under until it is completed!" (Lk 12.50), seems to say that Jesus intends
His death rather than only accepts it. But the very next verse, "Do you think that I
have come to bring peace to the earth? No, I tell you , but rather division!" (Lk
12.51 ), even more clearly seems to say that Jesus intends to bring about divi sion
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rather than only accepts inevitable conflict between people who will accept His
teaching and those who will reject it. Yet Jesus certainly intends only that people
accept His teaching and be reconciled with God - and so with one another.
Therefore, the previous verse need not be taken to mean that Jesus intends His death.
75. Xavier Leon-Dufour, Life and Death in the New Testament: The Teachings of
Jesus and Paul, trans. Terrence Prendergast (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986),
pp. 276-78 (his emphasis).
76. Cf. ibid., 89-117.
77. What about those who cannot cooperate with Jesus and receive holy
communion? Jesus ' mediation is the only way for fallen humans to be saved (see 1
Tm 2.4-5), and He not only makes His saving action available in the sacraments but
teaches that they are necessary for salvation (see In 2.5, 6.53-58). Those who,
having heard that teaching, fail to heed it reject all that God offers in Jesus. But
those who, through no fault of their own, are unable to respond to that teaching
nevertheless can be made participants in Jesus' saving work and its fruits by the
Holy Spirit's action; see Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, pp. 743-45 .
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